

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

TAB

TOP SECRET

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TALENT-KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND
IMPROVEMENT, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft Paper: "The Roles of the DCI..." (PRM-11,
Task 2)

The following observations and comments are provided on
those subjects within the Draft Paper applicable to our
organization.

a. A primary concern is the overall classification
of the paper. The "fact of" SIGINT reconnaissance satellite
activities is classified at a minimum SECRET TALENT-KEYHOLE.
This paper contains multiple entries dealing with SIGINT
satellite activities such as on page 43, yet the document is
not controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment.

25X1A Additionally, the NRO has requested the assis-
tance of the Special Security Center, CIA, to advise the
Intelligence Community to refrain from using the terminologies
of Special Air Force, or Special Activities, Air Force, as a
overt means of referring to the NRO. This request was generated
because this practice is dangerous to the maintenance of the
covert nature of the NRO. Should reference to the NRO be
required, correspondence should be handled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE
or [] channels.

b. The assertion that the Community maintains a
degree of insularity (page 34), and that there is a lack of
mutual understanding on both sides of the consumer-producer
interface may be somewhat overstated. In the specific case of
the NRO, direct support is provided to "Project Step Out", an
effort run by DIA. Product users--analysts from MIA, DIA, and
FTD--are hosted at collection sites with the specific objective
of improving the interface with producers and ultimately
product users.

Through my experience with the DOD's Defense
Intelligence Board, I feel that there has been a significant
effort to improve the consumer-producer relationship. We are

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also working closely with the Services on the subject of the application of national system derived data for tactical purposes, and significant progress is being made in this arena.

c. On the subject of programming and budgeting (pages 52-60), in retrospect the EXCOM type review mechanism served the NRO extremely well and did allow the DCI and the DOD to choose among options. It is important to recognize that the NRP, as compared to other intelligence programs, is unique in several ways and does not require the same type of management oversight. The NRP consists of a very limited number of programs and efforts that are relatively easy to understand at the program option level. The intelligence value of these programs is unchallenged, and warrant a special type, dedicated, review mechanism to insure that the program remains viable today and that potential future options are pursued energetically.

I hope that the above comments and observations are useful in evaluating this draft paper.

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Acting Director

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